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The 1972 Easter Offensive. What did Hanoi hope to achieve militarily and politically? What did they actually achieve? What were the long term implications of the Offensive for both sides?
The 1972 Easter Offensive was Vo Nguyen Giap’s third try at Mao’s third stage conventional warfare, the first being his General Offensive in the Red River Delta near Hanoi in 1951, the second being Tet in 1968 (although Giap was not an enthusiastic supporter of the decision to launch the Tet Offensive). He was surely hoping for better results this time around. The Offensive was dubbed the Nguyen Hue offensive after the emperor who had led the Vietnamese against the Chinese in the first Tet in 1798.
The leaders in Hanoi knew they could take advantage of ARVN, first because the U.S. had withdrawn the majority of its forces by then, and second they knew ARVN soldiers were not concentrated in large units, due in large part to the pacification strategy being pursued by the South Vietnamese military. Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and generals Giap and Van Tien Dung were seeking to destroy South Vietnam as a political and military entity, but they had long given up on the idea of a national uprising in the South, and since the PLAF (Viet Cong) had basically been wiped out during Tet and pacification, these men pushed to launch a conventional attack from the North, ultimately prevailing in an internal debate within the Politburo.
The big wild card was American air power. How much would the U.S. bring to bear? PAVN had massed large numbers of SA-2, SA-7s and anti-aircraft artillery around the DMZ with the goal of keeping U.S. bombers away from their advancing armies. It appears that they underestimated U.S. resolve. Remember, we still had a good amount of firepower in the area, bombers, helicopters, advisors, logistical support. The air firepower that the U.S. deployed was indeed the turning point, it was designed to do two things: directly support ARVN ground troops and also take the fight to North Vietnam. The Linebacker I operation was launched against the North, against supply lines and infrastructure, with the goal of crushing the logistical support of the offensive and forcing Hanoi leadership to the negotiating table. This strategy was largely successful.
The South Vietnamese were facing an all out conventional drive by PAVN. It was designed to hit on three fronts: in the North across the DMZ against Quang-Tri and then on to Hue with an inland hook maneuver; in the Central Highlands around Pleiku, Dak To, and Kontum; and in the area just northwest of Saigon around An Loc and Loc Ninh. In the North, they had immediate success, actually capturing Quang-Tri City for a time, but the northerner’s attack began to bog down when they met stiff resistance near Hue. Bat-21 was an important episode in this phase of the offensive.* The attack in the Central Highlands was launched a few days later and was also successful early on, but two old characters from the Ap Bac days, Ba and Vann, reappeared together to lead a victorious effort to hold Pleiku and repel PAVN forces. Tragically John Paul Vann would be killed a short time later. Down South the PAVN forces attacked from the Cambodian direction against An Loc and Loc Ninh. Again, they were successful early on but were unable to maintain their attacks, largely due to supply problems and American firepower and expertise. In An Loc there was a famous siege but ARVN held on long enough until American bombers arrived to turn the tide. The American who was influential there was James F. Hollingsworth.
So the Easter offensive was ultimately turned back. ARVN’s role was uneven, in some places they fought valiantly, in others they ran. The difference was the airpower supplied by the United States, primarily B-52 bombers, but lighter aircraft and helicopter gunships were also involved. Nixon was able to get Le Duc Tho to the bargaining table and it was a short-term shot in the arm for ARVN. But if you believe Troung Nhu Tang in his Viet Cong Memoir, the long term affect was to reinforce for ARVN that they were in trouble without U.S. firepower backing them up. For the North it was a military setback, another unsuccessful attempt at emulating Mao’s third stage, but, like in Tet, their success came far from the battlefield. The offensive was halted but many units remained in the country and the Politburo leveraged this strategic advantage successfully in the 1973 peace treaty to keep troops in South Vietnam. In a major victory for Le Duc Tho at the negotiating table a ceasefire in place was granted. The handwriting was on the wall for Thieu. The northerners were clearly in a perfect position to retool for the 1975 Ho Chi Minh Offensive.
*BAT 21 Bravo (30 March 1972): Mission in extreme north of South Vietnam, near DMZ, (I corp) above quang-tri during the Easter Offensive in which a pilot, Lt. Col. Iceal Hambleton, with the call signal BAT-21, was the only survivor of a shot down jamming aircraft. The rescue effort became exceptionally costly and controversial. First we sent in a “jolly green giant” Huey to try to get him but it was shot down, killing all on board, it was a disaster. Then we called a moratorium on shelling in his area while we tried to get him, which put the ARVN troops at risk, it is probable that South Vietnamese soldiers indirectly died as a result of their inability to obtain fire support, giving the impression, likely a correct one, that one American pilot was more important than a whole ARVN regiment. Hambleton and 1st Lt. Mark Clark (grandson of famed World War II General Mark W. Clark), who was shot down during rescue operations, were finally recovered from behind the front lines on two different nights in covert, night-time rescues. (McLellan, Dennis (September 27, 2004). “Bat 21 Rescue – Gene Hambleton, 85, His Rescue Depicted in ‘Bat-21’ Books, Film”. Los Angeles Times)
Parallel Narratives 
As usual with most of these internet illusions of history nothing is mentioned about the 196th Light Infantry Brigade or the 1st Cav or the many combat helicopter units that were in combat during the 1972 Easter Offensive of the N.V.A. I get so tired of these internet histories that keep saying it was ARVN troops that did the fighting! They basically retreated like they always did and got credit by the Nixon administration for doing such a “good” job – BULLSHIT! Every grunt involved knows it was the B-52’s that stopped the N.V.A. in their tracks south of Quang Tri in the North MR1 A.O. after they decimated the ARVN there and it was the 1st Cav and air strikes that stopped the NVA in the Tay Ninh/ Elephants Ear areas northwest of Saigon!
The “historians” and writers of this offensive has been too influenced by Government reports to even document the history correctly! Only a very few writers give the full correct story! Not to mentioned the bridge at Dong Ha as being a very minor slowdown of the NVA during the offensive as they quickly took over Quang Tri and Hwy 1 was their main offensive route in the spring of 1972 in the northern sector.
Yes. My Dad was there (196th). He told me they took fire every day. They didn’t get credit. They didn’t get credit because the rules of engagement said they shouldn’t be taking fire every day.
The evidence to support this claim includes:
An Associated Press (A.P.) clip titled “SYND 13-4-72 (April 13th, 1972) MUTINY BY US TROOPS, AT PHU BAI” can be found on YouTube. It shows my father standing next to an armed jeep as he was part of the recon unit.
An Associated Press (A.P.) clip titled: “SYND 8-5-72 (May 8th, 1972) US BRIGADE, THE SECOND, FIRST BATTALION, OF TASK FORCE LAFAYETTE, BASE at HUE” can be found on YouTube. The narrator states “Out in the gentle rolling country side southwest of Hue…a lonely contingent of Americans is on guard. They are part of 196 infantry brigade and their job is to protect the 2000 Americans who are still based at Phu Bai, the airport for Hue. There’s just one battalion of infantrymen up here with two companies out in the field at any one time. They work mostly at night setting ambushes and looking through their night sights for signs of North Vietnamese activity.” “These men are perhaps the most exposed U.S. troops in South Vietnam. Certainly those furthest to the north and closest to the threatened invasion of Hue and Phu Bai. They’ve got artillery support if they should need it but they are exposed and vulnerable nonetheless. In no sense are they in a position to withstand a serious north Vietnamese attack.” “The Americans want to keep their base at Phu Bai because of its importance for communications. Even more significant it would be embarrassing to abandon it now while south Vietnamese forces are still trying to recover their nerve after the disaster of Quang Tri in the expectation of a renewed attack on Hue. It’s a delicate situation yet to be resolved. Until it is the second first battalian of task force Lafayette goes on waiting nerviously in the sweltering sun for something unpleasant to happen.”
Richard Nixon made an oval office addres on April 26th, 1972 stating “…During the past three weeks you’ve been hearing about the massive invasion of south Vietnam by the communist armies of North Vietnam…three weeks ago on Easter weekend they mounted their massive invasion of south Vietnam. Three militarized divisions swept across the demilitarized zone…”. Nixon later states…”This attack has been resisted on the ground entirely by south Vietnamese forces…there are no United States ground forces involved. None will be involved…”
My follow up comment has been awaiting moderation since March 17, 2024 at 5:36 pm (11 days ago) (posted as William Taylor). I think that comment is consistent with your narrative where you write “they received stiff resistance near Hue” which is where my father and his unit (196th) were placed as evidenced by the references provided. Respectfully, William Znidarsic III
I was in An Loc in April 1972. I was a crewchief aboard a UH-1H “Assault Helicopter” from the the “Deans” in the 1st Aviation Brigade. I watched ARVN run. I had to cover their miserable asses for 3 days out of Loc Nyhn. I’ve never seen any mention of our support.
The First Cavalry did NOT fight in the Easter Offensive…
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I was with the 196th LIght Infantry Bde during this period and we were in the field around Phu Bai during this time and were told of the NVA and them having tanks coming south to engage us . We were issued M-72 LAWS ” anti-tank rounds to use and I was pulled out and we were trained on the new Armor Weapon ,the TOW Missile . We were then used to train the Arvn ‘s to use it in the Easter Offensive. The last I heard , they were overrun and they ran off leaving their TOWS for the oncoming NVA. Prior to rejoining our unit, we were flown out onto a US Aircraft Carrier, to train our US Marines on how to use the TOW Missile.
To Jack kennedy: the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and the 1st cav were both in the bush/field during the “Easter offensive” of 1972. Both were in combat with the 196th near phu bai and the 1st cab near an loc! Believe me I know I was with the 196th. Both were in combat until August 1972. You have not a clue on what you are talking about!
the 196th and first cav were not close 2 any heavy fighting,the arvins did all the heavy stuff,that i know for a fact,any questions call tom at 512-825-1885,the 196th did have 1 artillery battery,firing support from miles away,iknow 3 advisors that were at kontum,anh loc and loc ninh,they were down in toc bunkers with the radios bringing in air srikes,i have 2 s viet friends in saigon that were at loc ninh and anh loc they said there were no grunts in action and the adisors were deep under ground
my cousin was in the 196th in 72 he said they ,the grunts were 60 miles from the fighting except for the art. battery,they were about 12 miles away.grunts were far from the combat zone,nixon would not alow them 2 engage ist cav and 196th only had 1200 troops each,9th marines were off coast near danand ,never came ashore,nixons orders 2 few,my chppewa indian buddy was so diappoined,my yavipi apache buddy was ichin 2 fight,was in 196th near phu bai,they wouldnt let them fight 2 few and it was an election year.
I am not sure were you get your information from. First, hue and quang tri is only about 58km , which is much less than 60 miles – .61 miles per km! The 196th was west of hue and was within sight of the mountains were most Arvn firebases had been overrun! Also, I am not sure what you call “heavy fighting” or the “combat zone”, since all of Vietnam was a combat zone! Out of the 58,000 plus that died in Vietnam most were in smaller firefights, booby traps, and small abuses. If you don’t think humping the bush was “combat” then you have no respect for what the infantry did there.
I was in the tri star compound in quang tri at the start of the easter offensive in 1972 from 30 march until April 2 1972. We sure could have used some of the first cav and the 196th light infantry brigade to help us to get out of the compound instead of waiting for 4 days for a chinook to get us out. I was there.
Well the First Cav was in the bush northwest of Saigon during the Easter offensive, so it would have been impossible for them to get up to Quang tri , and the 196th was northwest of phu bai and west of hue as a blocking force since the nva had taken all the firebases west of hue. I will agree that the 196th was not involved in “heavy combat”, but that is not what military command designated their job to be. All arvn units at or near quang tri was quickly defeated. I still feel if it was not for the B-52’s stopping the nva advance south of quang tri, then the 196th – whom was only at brigade strength would have also been decimated by the multi division offensive nva advance. Maybe that would have made some of you all happy!
With that said, it should be noted that the First Cav and the 196th was quite effective in stopping or interfering with smaller sapper squads and advance nva recon during the Easter offensive, which was their assignment and mission! Yes, we were issued m-72 rocket launchers and gas masks at that time and were expecting tanks and nva armour, since the us army had little to no tanks or amour to fight the nva advance! I guess if we were overran and decimated it would give your “cousins, and whatever in Saigon a REAL war story to tell!!!!!! Sorry some of you had to be in quang tri a few days before being choppered out. That is something you need to address to military command and/or intelligence and not the grunts in the field that had no say so in troop placement or movements! You type of people piss me off!!!!!
Do not agree that it was the Arvn that turned back the nva offensive! It was the B-52’s and U. S. Air power that stopped the offensive south of quang tri. The nva never made it to hue. Saying that the Arvn stopped it is just an echo of Nixon and U.S. government, which was totally inaccurate!!!! B. J. Phillips 196th light infantry brigade 1971-72
How about the 7/17th Air Cavalry in the Central Highlands? I was there and was wounded in action west of Plieku while serving in C Troop. The war was not fought only in I Corps. We were engaging and killing NVA nearly every day in II Corps during the Easter Offensive.
Most people do not know that the 1972 Easter offensive was the largest to date during the Vietnam war. The majority of “historians” write what Nixon/government supplied as information, and has resulted in woefully inaccurate “facts”! The nva had three thrust into south vn: across dmz, central highlands, and fishhook (An loc, Tay ninh). Army units such as 7/17 Did a big part in stymie their attacks with aerial defense!!!! Too many only concentrate on “major battles”, which actually there were few, but focused on hue in 68, hamburger hill (which wasn’t a big fight, and other “headlines” fights. In doing so they miss the real fights and distort history!
Fred Edens’ comments regarding the 7/17th Air Cavalry are important to me, as I served as an Advisor to Vietnamese and Ranger units during the Easter offensive. I was hospitalized alongside a Warrant Officer, who was shot down in an OH-6, as I recall. Should Fred Edens have been my hospital mate, or know of these circumstances, please respond as I am in great need of supporting information during that hellacious period.
I started flying as a scout in F trp 8th cav from March until the end of june. That’s when I left the country. Major Jack Kennedy was my C/O. We lost a Huey crew trying to rescue Bat 21. The gunner jose was captured after being wounded. The pilots and crew chief were killed. 2 weeks before I left country we lost 2 loaches. Both crews were kia. I don’t know about rest of the country I just know what I went through. I also have some blurry pics of Highway one. We called it the junkyard lot’s of burned out vehicles.
The First Cav was in the field during the Easter offensive and until August 1972, so they were in combat until then and during the Easter offensive! You are wrong! Also, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade was also in the bush until August 10, 1972, so both were in combat until then. Quite paying attention to Nixon propaganda and realilizing historical facts! You are so uniformed and have no idea what you talking about! B. J. Phillips, Co. D, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 3/21, 1970-72
I was there with you in D company in 72
To N. Dymock: I have had some of my records/awards destroyed! Would your Air Medal award orders have my name on it? Spc4 William J. Phillips. D. Co. 3/21 around June or July 1972? Trying to have my DD214 corrected.
You guys blocked my post when I was speaking for my father who was at the easter offensive. Why don’t you speak the truth and give the 196th the due respect they deserve and never got cuz the rules of engagement didn’t allow it. William Znidarsic III
My younger brother served in the 196 lt. Inf. Bdg. during the Easter Offensive of 72. He was wounded during fierce firefighters, ambushes , arty, mortar and rocket fire, to include tanks. My brother was very humble about his service in Nam, so when he opened up to me 50 or so years later, I believed him. He has a letter of commendation from his superior officer to reflect his PH, BSV during the mentioned offensive.
His unit suffered casualties Kia and Wia.
You guys blocked my recent comment because it provided links to information that would help these veterans prove their disability claims. You blocked the comments despite speaking for my father who was in combat during the easter offensive and received 100% disability aa a result. William John Znidarsic